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Phenomenological Discoveries Concerning the ‘We’:  
Mapping the Terrain  
 




  “(…) I, we, and world belong together.” 
   (Husserl, Ideen II, 288) 
 
 “Even the Being-alone of Dasein is Being-with in the world.”  
  (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 120) 
 
 “(…) the I is but a ‘part’ of the We, and the We an essential part of the I.” 





I. From the second-person perspective to the first-person plural (and back) 
 
What is it to belong to a ‘we’ or an ‘us’? What is the nature of interpersonal un-
derstanding, social interaction, and social participation? For instance, is sharing a 
common sociocultural environment, a common history, or a common life-world, 
prior to, or even a necessary condition for, such understanding, interaction or 
participation, or, rather, a result of them? How can we collectively—rather than 
just you and me, and others—constitute and share norms, experiences, or even emo-
tions? Are there any other ‘proprietors’ of the social domain? Is social reality 
composed entirely of individuals, or are there also irreducibly plural subjects or 
‘We’-agents? 
 Curiously, the nature of social and collective identity or plural agency has 
not been at the forefront of philosophy over the past hundred years, although it 
has been treated in sociology and in those social sciences inspired by Marxism 
and, in some more restricted circles, by Hegelianism. As a matter of fact, the issue 
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of collectivity has only relatively recently been given serious attention in analytic 
philosophy, especially in the work of Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, Philip 
Pettit, Carol Rovane, John Searle, or Raimo Tuomela. There is an older tradition 
especially stemming from the work of Peter Winch or Georg Henrik von Wright, 
which was, in turn, inspired by Wittgenstein and Collingwood, but this tended 
towards the philosophical critique of sociological explanation rather than an ex-
amination of the nature and varieties of togetherness. 
 Arguably, however, when looking back over the last century of thinking 
about sociality, there seems to be no other single intellectual tradition within phi-
losophy, or even in neighbouring disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, 
including sociology, other than phenomenology, that has endeavored to address 
the issue of interpersonal understanding, collectivity and togetherness with such 
rigour and detail. Phenomenology, from its very inception and for systematic rea-
sons, was always synonymous with the phenomenology of sociality, the careful 
descriptive elucidation of the layers and strata of both social and collective life. 
Moreover, as the epigraphs of this article vividly illustrate, a great number of phe-
nomenologists, even if certainly not all, would concur with the idea that sociality 
is not only a matter of intersubjectivity, of relations between subjects, in the sense of 
you and me appropriately interacting, but also of me, or me and you, relating to a 
we, or forming an us which may or may not be formed against a them. The differ-
ent forms of ‘We’ may eventually be more or less rationally or normatively coher-
ent, more or less emotionally cohesive, or more or less diachronically or institu-
tionally robust, and may, in different contexts, be formed out of very different 
reasons, or pursue, as group agents, very different goals. To be sure, the very no-
tion of an irreducible collective subject, or group agent, is controversial, and it is 
one of the themes explored in this book. 
 All the contributions of the present volume share the conviction that phe-
nomenology is always a phenomenology of sociality. They also agree that phe-
nomenologists of the social have to endorse, or at least critically confront, not 
only the second-person perspective but also the first-person perspective plural. 
Although phenomenology has always insisted on the first- as well as the second-
person (singular) perspective regarding consciousness, subjectivity, and intersub-
jectivity, there is also a first- and indeed second-person plural. This recognition of 
the need of singularity, of alterity, as well as of plurality in the understanding of 
subjectivity is, incidentally, a perspective that Husserl famously invoked when he 
expressed the need for a methodological shift from the ego cogito to a nos cogitamus 
(Husserl 1959, 316; cf. Carr 1986). In fact—and contrary to still widespread prej-
udices––it is entirely wrong to conceive of phenomenology as practicing any form 
of methodological individualism, let alone solipsism. Rather, phenomenology has 
always recognized that humans come to develop their intentional, meaningful, 
and meaning-constituting lives always and only in the context of a given socio-
historical context, a common background, or a set of shared habits, and embed-
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ded in a world in which they participate, and which they possibly aim to individu-
ally or collectively transform. Thus, phenomenologists, however much they differ 
in degree and commitment, all agree on the basic idea that humans are intrinsical-
ly social beings, acting within specific historical and cultural contexts, and embed-
ded in a shared life-world. Phenomenologists of all traditions and hues have 
sought to analyze the complex network of social relations and social acts, consti-
tutive of values, norms, communities and social or institutional facts. Phenome-
nological conceptions of sociality, moreover, are expressed in a particularly rich 
range of notions. For example, virtually all phenomenologists, including above all 
Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schütz, or Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, have elaborated on the core notion of the intersubjective encounter, ‘em-
pathy’ (Einfühlung), while others have employed cognate conceptions of ‘being-
with-others’ (Heidegger’s ‘Being-with’ or Sartre’s ‘Being-for-Others’). But, beyond 
this fairly well-known conceptual territory, most phenomenologists have also re-
ferred to vocabulary that points not only to interpersonal but to collective or genuine-
ly communal engagements, such as ‘consociality’ (Schütz), ‘common minds’ and 
‘higher order persons’, the ‘we-world’, ‘communalization’ and ‘socialization’ 
(Husserl), ‘communal persons’ (Scheler), or ‘Being-for-groups’ and ‘Being-in-
groups’ (Sartre), to name just a few. Many of these concepts are explored in the 
contributions in this volume. 
 In a remarkable historical turn, these very phenomenological notions can 
also be found re-expressed in somewhat different technical terms in contempo-
rary analytic ‘social ontology’—indeed, it is notable that the very term ‘social on-
tology’ was first coined by Husserl more than a hundred years ago (Husserl 1973, 
102; cf. also Salice 2013; Caminada 2011; Szanto forthcoming). Current social 
ontology studies collective practices, social institutions and cultural products that 
are, in some sense or another, dependent on what has been called collective inten-
tionality, shared goals, collective agreements, or joint commitment. Searle, for 
example, claims that “social ontology is both created by human actions and atti-
tudes but at the same time has an epistemically objective existence and is part of 
the natural world” (Searle 2006, 12). Phenomenology has long understood and 
analyzed such ‘creation’ as genuinely social constitution, without, to be sure, simply 
confusing the (social) constitution of social reality with the social construction of 
reality (cf. Berger/Luckmann 1966; Collin 1997, 110–121). Very few contempo-
rary analytic social ontologists are familiar with the phenomenological tradition 
(e.g., Schmid 2009), and most simply ignore it. On the other hand, many phe-
nomenologists offer powerful lines of argument that challenge the hitherto pre-
dominantly analytic discussions, which often all-too narrowly focus on team-
reasoning, joint commitments, or shared agency. Current social ontology could 
greatly benefit from reintegrating the respective phenomenological insights con-
cerning, for instance, the role of affectivity, habituality or embodiment in collec-
tive intentionality, as could, conversely, the phenomenology of sociality benefit 
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from such a contemporary reassessment. Thus, by setting its methods and vocab-
ulary in the context of current research, this book aims to eventually transform 
the understanding and reception of social phenomenology as well as to contribute 
to the contemporary debates in social philosophy, social cognition and social on-
tology. 
 The same applies to social cognition as to social ontology: philosophical 
work on what is now the rapidly growing area of social cognition—our ability to 
interpret and understand others—is also in the process of ‘rediscovering’ core 
conceptions of the phenomenology of sociality, such as empathy (Stueber 2006), 
or the affective and embodied nature of socio-cognitive engagements, which were 
long emphasized and extensively studied by phenomenologists (cf. Taipale 2014; 
Jensen/Moran 2013). The essays of this book will discuss and develop these in-
sights in articulating, for a new era, phenomenology’s contribution to the social 
cognition literature. 
 Let us now outline in more detail some of the main issues that have domi-
nated the philosophy of sociality over the past two decades. In doing so, we will 
point to some important, but hitherto underexposed, connections between social 
cognition research, social ontology and social philosophy more broadly con-
ceived, and notably to those desiderata that will be addressed in this volume. 
 Consider first interpersonal relations, which have been the object of much 
scrutiny lately within the social cognition paradigm. One of the core, and still 
largely unsettled, issues here is how to explain our psychological, epistemic, or 
emotional access to other minds. This debate has become known as the ‘theory of 
mind’ or the ‘mindreading’ debate (Davies/Stone 1995a, 1995b; Coplan/Goldie 
2011; Decety 2012; Baron-Cohen et al. 2013, Stueber 2013; Michael 2014; Zahavi 
2014). Is social cognition grounded in explicitly or non-inferentially simulating or 
imitating (e.g., Heal 1995; Goldman 2006; Stueber 2006; Gordon 2008) or sub-
personally mirroring (Gallese 2001) others’ experiences in oneself, or in adapting 
others’ first-person perspective; or is it rather to be conceived of as engaging in a 
conceptual, inferential and interpretative activity of mindreading, by applying a 
folk-psychological theory of mind to oneself and others (Leslie 1987; Go-
pnik/Wellman 1992; Meltzoff/Gopnik 1993; Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie et al. 
2004), or, as yet others claim, by employing some so-called ‘hybrid’ strategy of 
simulating-cum-projecting mental models (Nichols/Stich 2003)? Meanwhile, and 
as the debate between theory-theorists and simulation-theorists (and hybrid theo-
rists) has already become somewhat deadlocked, phenomenologically inspired 
theorists have put much pressure on both camps, and argued for novel ways to 
conceptualize of what they would usually refer to as ‘empathy’ (Einfühlung). They 
argue that our ability to experience and understand others rests on a specific form 
of ‘direct perception’ of others’ expressions and their social context, or is a ‘sui 
generis experience’ of the embodied mind of others (Ratcliffe 2007; Gallagher 
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2008; Krueger/Overgaard 2012; cf. Jensen/Moran 2012, 2013, and, critically, 
Jacob 2011, and Zahavi 2014).  
The social cognition debate is very active, but, curiously, it has not attended 
properly to what phenomenologists have long acknowledged as the passive, ha-
bitualized, affective or embodied nature of social interaction. The social cognition 
debate has also largely ignored the role of a common background of shared val-
ues, habits or perspectives, the role of social typification, or the role of a shared 
and essentially social life-world, sometimes called a ‘we-world’ (Husserl). 
Furthermore, one of the fault lines in the discussion opens up around the 
question as to whether some form of sharing of experiences, and of affective 
states in particular, between an empathiser and the target subject is necessary for 
empathy to succeed and, if so, what this sharing precisely amounts to (Jacob 
2011; Michael/Fardo 2014; Zahavi 2011, 2014).  
The issue of ‘sharing’, and especially the sharing of mental properties or ac-
tions, has been recently addressed by a number of analytic philosophers of action 
working on collective intentionality and joint agency. They have investigated how 
it is possible for two or more individuals to intend to do something, or to coop-
erate in doing what they intend. Discussions in this area have typically focused on 
the question of whether collective intentions and agency are reducible to an ag-
gregation of individual agents and, if not, whether we would then need to postu-
late some supra-individual bearer, some group mind, group person, or group 
agent, of the collective intentionality (cf. Huebner 2014; Szanto 2014). More spe-
cifically, philosophers of action dwelled upon the question of where to ‘tie in’, as 
it were, the ‘jointness’ in collective engagements: in the intentional object, or the 
‘interlocking’ of interdependent intentional plans and shared goals (Bratman 
1992, 1993, 2014), the ‘we-mode’ (e.g., Searle 1995, 2010; Tuomela 2007, 2013), 
the ‘plural subject’ (Gilbert 1989, 2013) of collective intentions, or some other 
form of ‘rational integration’ individuals (Rovane 1998, 2014; Pettit 2003; 
List/Pettit 2011). 
 When it comes to broader ontological issues concerning social reality, ana-
lytic social ontology also differs from earlier debates in the philosophy of the so-
cial sciences. Earlier debates have largely focused on the issue of methodological 
individualism versus holism understood as an explanatory programme (cf. O’Neill 
1973; Udehn 2002; Zahle/Finn 2014), or on the issue of explanation vs. under-
standing (e.g., in the work of G. H. von Wright or Karl-Otto Apel, see Richard 
Wolin’s contribution in this volume). In contrast, current social ontology typically 
proceeds by reflecting on the related but different metaphysical and normative 
issues concerning the relation between individuals and social entities and the 
proper ontological status of the latter (cf. Ruben 1985). To get a fair idea of what 
is at stake here, consider three doctrines, which, in one form or another and even 
if sometimes under different headings, can be encountered in most contemporary 
social ontologies (e.g., Gilbert 1989; Pettit 1993, 2014): 
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Intentional-Psychological and Social Holism: The conditions of individuation of a 
subject S’s conscious intentional states and its (objective and/or phenome-
nal) contents are fixed by (i.) the intra-subjective relations that those states 
have vis-à-vis other intentional states of S, and (ii.) by the inter-subjective 
and social relations that S bears to other subjects (S* ... S*n) (and their in-
tentional states). 
 
Socio-Ontological Anti-Singularism: Social reality comprises not only individuals 
but also social entities and collectives and, possibly, higher order or supra-
individual entities/properties (possibly with their own laws and systemic, 
normative, etc. structures governing them), which are not reducible to, but 
may be founded, or supervene, upon, individuals. 
 
Ontological and Normative Anti-Collectivism: Individual intentional psychology 
and personhood (including its ontological and moral properties, such as au-
tonomous agency, volition, spontaneity, moral accountability, dignity, etc.) 
is in no way compromised, i.e., ‘outflanked’ or ‘overridden’ (Pettit 1993), by 
an individual’s (membership-)relations to social collectives and the (inten-
tional, normative, etc.) laws governing such collectives. 
 
On the face of it, it seems as if these claims run counter to one another. In par-
ticular, the third doctrine, anti-collectivism, seems to be incompatible, or, at least, 
in serious tension, with the first two. As a number of contributions in this volume 
powerfully demonstrate, however, most phenomenological versions of social on-
tology can accommodate all three claims without encountering a contradiction 
(cf. esp. the articles of Caminada, O’Madagain, Szanto, and Vendrell Ferran). 
 It is surely the case that social cognition, social ontology and collective in-
tentionality do not represent opposing lines of research, and that the respective 
issues should be dealt with side by side. This, however, is still far from the current 
situation. Only in very recent times can one witness a growing but still rather un-
derdeveloped tendency to link the issues in social cognition to social interaction, 
sometimes referred to as ‘interaction theory’ (IT) (De Jaegher/Di Paolo 2007; De 
Jaegher et al. 2010; Gallagher/Varga 2013; Satne/Roepstorff 2015; cf., critically, 
Herschbach 2012; Michael/Overgaard 2013, Michael/Christensen/Overgaard 
2014). Even less developed are recent attempts to discuss social cognition in rela-
tion to collective intentionality and shared agency (Butterfill 2013; Tomasello 
2014; Zahavi 2014; cf. Szanto/Moran 2015 and Felipe León’s contribution). 
Among the issues dealt with within this paradigm, the phenomenon of joint at-
tention (Eilan et al. 2005; Seemann 2012; cf. Baron-Cohen 1995) figures predom-
inantly. Given the crucial developmental role of this form of social cognition 
(Tomasello 2014), this is a little surprising. But, again, what is indeed surprising, 
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especially when viewed from a phenomenological perspective, is the almost com-
plete ignorance within the collective intentionality debate of the single most basic 
form of social cognition, to wit, empathy. 
 This lacuna is all the more apparent given that, in sociology, social psychol-
ogy, and the collective intentionality debate, there has recently been a very lively 
debate on shared affectivity and collective emotions (e.g., Parkinson et al. 2005; 
von Scheve/Salmela 2014; Stets/Turner 2014). Given that empathy is the primary 
access to emotions and affective states—though empathy is surely not restricted 
to such states—the absence of research on the matter is somewhat puzzling.  
 Social relations are, almost always, emotionally charged, and have some af-
fective dimension. Sociality has not only its ontology and epistemology, therefore, but 
also its specific and often richly differentiated phenomenology. Other individuals and 
groups matter to us, or concern us; some matter to us more, some less. Accordingly, 
our empathic access, too, will vary, based, typically, on our social typification, 
identification and our social distinctions (cf. Eres/Molenberghs 2013). Social 
cognition is typically not just cognition but, rather, affective and embodied interaction. 
Similarly, collective intentionality and group agency involve not just coordination, 
team-reasoning or rational agency, but may also involve shared emotions and 
values. And some would even go so far as to attribute collective or corporate 
emotions to whole groups.  
 Within the collective intentionality debate, the focus has specifically been 
on the sense and feeling of sharedness, and their role in joint commitments and 
shared agency (Michael 2011), as well as on socially extended or distributed emo-
tions (Krueger 2015) and genuinely collective or group-level emotions (Helm 
2008, 2014; Schmid 2009, 2014; Konzelmann Ziv 2007, 2009; Huebner 2011; 
Salmela 2011, 2014; Gilbert 2002, 2014; Guerrero 2014; Schützeichel 2014). 
 Phenomenologists have long recognized affectivity and emotions as integral 
building blocks of social reality. As many of the contributions to this volume 
demonstrate, we can find the most elaborate analyses of shared affectivity and 
social emotions (such as grief, shame, etc.) in the work of the so-called ‘early’ or 
‘realist’ phenomenologists from the Munich and Göttingen Circles, such as Max 
Scheler, Gerda Walther, Edith Stein, or Dietrich von Hildebrand, but such anal-
yses may also be found in the work of such figures as Gurwitsch or Merleau-
Ponty (see esp. the contributions in Part III and Part IV; cf. Szanto forthcoming 
b).  
 In this connection, phenomenologists have argued for the following claims, 
though with quite different emphases1:  
 
                                                
1 Notice that these claims, which are left deliberately vague at some junctures so as to accommo-
date the different stances different phenomenologists would take on them, partly mirror the 
above-stated socio-ontological claims. For the different weighing and emphasis of each of these 
claims, see again the articles in Part III and Part IV, and especially Vendrell Ferran’s contribution. 
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Socio-Normative Embeddedness of Emotions: A subject’s emotional directedness 
towards objects and persons, i.e., his ‘affective intentionality’, is deeply em-
bedded in our social environment, and our shared (aesthetic and moral) 
norms and values.  
 
Social Holism regarding Emotions: Given the socio-normative embeddedness of 
emotions, but also moving beyond that, a subject’s experience, expression 
and/or regulation of her (social or non-social) emotions is socially modulat-
ed or co-constituted by her interpersonal relationships, her social identity, 
or her membership in certain groups. 
 
Anti-Singularism regarding Emotions: Emotions, or some aspects of emotions 
(e.g., their expression or regulation), are not, as it were, bound to their typi-
cal phenomenal locus of instantiation, namely individuals. Rather, under 
certain conditions, in certain types of communities, and in some sense or 
another (e.g., in terms of ‘joint ownership’, synchronous ‘entrainment’, ‘so-
cial appraisal’), emotions can be shared among or across individuals, or may 
even be attributed to collectives as such, which can then be said to have an 
emotional life of their own. 
 
Notice that, if these claims go through, they will not only hold for distinctively 
social, or other-directed emotions, such as resentment, betrayal, or grief, but ra-
ther quite generally for all kinds of affective states and emotions. Given that there 
has been quite some confusion about this (cf. Darwall 1998; Zahavi 2014, 2015), 
it is also worth mentioning that none of these claims entails any equivalence be-
tween empathy and shared emotions. Since, phenomenologically viewed at least, 
empathy is neither necessarily an affective state, nor presupposes any interperson-
al similarity between the affective sates of empathizer and target (cf. Jacob 2011 
versus Zahavi 2011), the fact that virtually all phenomenologists stress the rele-
vance of empathy for interpersonal engagements has nothing to do with any of 
their arguments for the above three claims. Quite the contrary, phenomenologists 
from the outset have been adamant in emphasizing the difference between empa-
thy and emotional sharing. For a striking example, just think of Scheler’s (1926) 
fine-grained conceptual distinctions that disambiguate between ‘empathy’ (Nach-
fühlen), ‘feeling-with’ (Mitfühlen, Sympathie), or joint and shared feelings (Einsfühlung, 
Miteinanderfühlen) (see also Stein 1917, 1920, or Walther 1923; Konzelman Ziv 
2007; Zahavi 2015). 
 There are two further reasons why phenomenological accounts can con-
tribute to moving towards a more adequate and more comprehensive theory of 
shared affectivity: (1) first, phenomenological accounts may help to circumvent 
problems associated with both phenomenal token-identity construal of shared 
emotions, on the one hand, and cognitivist-cum-normativist accounts, on the oth-
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er hand. According to the phenomenalist account, collective emotions entail a 
“phenomenological fusion” of emotions, such that “there is one token affective 
state in which many individuals take part”, and which has its own “phenomeno-
logical subject” (Schmid 2014, 9; cf. Schmid 2009); meanwhile, according to cog-
nitivist-cum-normativist accounts, collective emotions are a matter of ‘joint com-
mitments to feel’ (Gilbert 2002, 2014; cf. Helm 2014). From a phenomenological 
point of view, both accounts are, however, seriously limited (see the contributions 
in Part IV; cf. Salmela 2012; and Szanto forthcoming b). (2) Secondly, phenome-
nological accounts of emotions emphasize the intentional (object-related), cogni-
tive, evaluative and normative, but also the passive, affective, and embodied, as-
pects of emotions (Vendrell Ferran 2008). And since, arguably, both cognitive 
and non-cognitive components are at play in sharing emotions, the phenomeno-
logical approach is best suited to addressing this issue.  
 Beyond the discussion on shared and collective emotions, phenomenolo-
gists offer uniquely rich ways to address distinctively other-directed, or social, 
emotions, such as shame or grief (see esp. the contributions of Steven Crowell, Mat-
thew Ratcliffe and Christian Skirke; cf. also Léon 2013; Zahavi 2014). Moreover, 
given many phenomenologists’ insistence on the intrinsic relation between emo-
tions and (shared) norms and values—think of the theory of ‘value-ception’ 
(Wertnehmen) in Scheler, Stein or Husserl—phenomenologists are particularly well 
prepared to contribute to the moral psychology of social emotions such as guilt 
or forgiveness (Rinofner-Kreidl 2013, 2014; Steinbock 2014). 
 Finally, this brings us to yet another important avenue upon which phe-
nomenologists and their ‘offspring’ have embarked in elucidating social reality—
an avenue, for one, that has been endorsed only by strikingly few authors within 
contemporary social phenomenology, or even social philosophy in general: name-
ly the moral, normative and especially the political dimensions of the ‘We’. 
 Phenomenologists are generally not only opposed to any form of solipsism 
and individualism but, moreover—and in stark contrast to the much more re-
stricted focus of standard contemporary social ontology (cf., however, Pettit 1997 
and Gilbert 2006)—their contribution to the analysis of social reality was never 
purely an ontological, epistemological, or, for that matter, purely philosophical or 
phenomenological, enterprise. Thus, from Husserl, to Scheler, Stein, and Schütz, or 
Arendt, and from Merleau-Ponty to Sartre, virtually all thinkers of the phenome-
nological movement were deeply interested in contemporary sociological, social 
and political thought, and many typically also engaged directly in concrete social 
movements, of their times: these included educational reform (e.g., Stein), the 
Catholic ‘communatarism’ avant-la-lettre of the interwar period (e.g., Scheler, Stein, 
or Hildebrand), postwar Marxism (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Paci or Trân Duc 
Thao), or postwar anti-(Soviet)-Communism (Merleau-Ponty or Patočka), just to 
name a few (cf. Waldenfels et al. 1977ff.). Thus, we fully endorse Michael Gub-
ser’s recent corrective to this narrative:  
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When future historians chronicle the twentieth century, they will see phenomenology 
as one of the preeminent social and ethical philosophies of its age. (…) Central to the 
tradition from the start (…) was a preoccupation with ethics and social renewal—at 
times overt, often implicit—that inspired not only second-generation phenomenolo-
gists engagé, but also the founders. (Gubser 2014, 1) 
 
Consequently, the book shall also contribute to restoring and recasting certain 
normative conceptions of sociality as discussed in postwar and post-Frankfurt-
School moral, social, and political philosophy, and especially in the work of au-
thors like Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Stephen 
Darwall.  
 We hope, then, to have made a clear enough case why phenomenology is a 
most suitable candidate for making an impact on the contemporary landscape in 
regard to social ontology, social cognition and the philosophical study of sociality 
generally. But, surely, one might still wonder whether we need another phenome-
nologically oriented collection of essays on this topic. If we look at the English, 
German, or French contemporary literature on the subject, though, we take the 
answer to be clearly positive. For one, notwithstanding lively debates and an ever-
growing interest in phenomenology in the English-speaking world, which is also 
reflected in an increasing number of edited volumes, companions and handbooks 
(Moran 2000; Dreyfus/Wrathall 2009; Luft/Overgaard 2012; Zahavi 2012), 
somewhat surprisingly, there is yet no single comparable account of the phenom-
enology of sociality available. To be sure, in recent years, a fair number of mono-
graphs have been devoted to ‘second-person phenomenology’, or the phenome-
nology of interpersonal relations and intersubjectivity (Theunissen 1965; Walden-
fels 1971; Haney 1994; Steinbock 1995; Zahavi 2001, 2014; Schmid 2001). How-
ever, with very few exceptions (McMullin 2013; Theunissen 1965), they have typi-
cally restricted their focus to Husserl or broadly Husserlian phenomenology. 
Moreover, ‘discovering the “We”’ means, as we have seen, essentially moving 
beyond the merely interpersonal domain, and incorporating investigations of the 
first-person plural, or ‘we-mode’ (Tuomela 2007), as well as the broader socio-
normative contexts arising from such we-intentionality (cf. Chelstrom 2013). This 
is the distinctively novel focus of the present volume.2 
 In addition, phenomenological contributions to the philosophy of the social 
sciences and sociology have more often than not been restricted to work on 
Schütz’s (and Luckmann’s; e.g. Schütz/Luckmann 2003), arguably seminal, analy-
sis of social reality. Thus, Schützian sociology of knowledge and interpretative 
                                                
2 Here it should not go unnoticed that there are in fact a number of more specific, and almost 
exclusively Husserlian, works focused on elaborating on a phenomenological social ontology, 
often with quite domain-specific analyses (e.g., pertaining to the specific types of collectives, the 
state, etc.) (e.g., Toulemont 1962, Schuhmann 1988, Perreau 2013); for an interesting, Husserlian 
inspired, but highly original, recent account of social ontology, see also Hart 1992; for more liter-
ature regarding this line of research, see also Szanto forthcoming a. 
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sociology (the so-called Wissenssoziologie, or Verstehende Soziologie) have hitherto 
either been the dominant paradigms for phenomenology’s contribution to the 
philosophy of the social sciences (Natanson 1970, 1973; Barber/Dreher 2014; cf. 
Collin 1997)3, or else were confined between the covers of editions entitled Phe-
nomenology and Marxism (Waldenfels et al. 1977ff.), however valuable those collec-
tions indeed were for the reception of a phenomenology of sociality.4 However, 
we believe that this view is in many ways limited (see also Vendrell Ferran’s contri-
bution). We contend that there is a whole series of other positions, in particular 
within the so-called ‘early,’ or ‘realist,’ phenomenological movement, but also 
within the work of the movement’s founding fathers, Husserl or Scheler, and its 
French or American (e.g., Gurwitsch) avenues and crossings, to be rediscovered 
for social philosophy—as well as for, it’s fair to say, most social phenomenologists 
working today. Accordingly, in contrast to standard accounts, one of the special 
features of the volume is that a number of essays will critically engage with lesser-
known but still important authors of the phenomenological movement. Thus, the 
volume will focus not only on the work of the most influential German and post-
war French phenomenologists of sociality (notably Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, Max Scheler, Alfred Schütz, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
or Emmanuel Levinas), but will also cover relevant topics in the highly sophisti-
cated social ontologies of such lesser-known figures as Adolf Reinach, Edith 
Stein, Gerda Walther, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Karl Löwith or Aron Gurwitsch. 
Furthermore, a number of essays will deal with prominent philosophers who, 
though not part of the phenomenological movement strictly speaking, have sym-
pathetically or critically engaged with or have been strongly influenced by phe-
nomenological thought, viz. Martin Buber, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Ha-
bermas, Hannah Arendt, or Jean-François Lyotard.5 
 In summary, then, the ambition of the volume is to reevaluate, critically and 
in contemporary terms, the unprecedentedly rich phenomenological resources 
regarding social reality on the level of interpersonal, collective and communal 
engagements. In doing so, the book pursues three objectives: first, it aims to sys-
tematically explore all the key phenomenological aspects of social reality, ranging 
from its cognitive, intentional, agential, and affective to its normative and political 
dimensions; secondly, to offer novel assessments of central but also less well-
                                                
3 Introductory textbooks or collected volumes on (again mostly Schützian) phenomenological sociology 
abound, to be sure; see, e.g., Wagner 1983; Grathoff 1995; Benoist/Karstenti 2001; Ferguson 
2006; Bühl 2007; Fischer 2012. 
4 Think also of the by now largely forgotten, but at the time highly influential, works of Trân Duc 
Thao (esp. 1951), or Enzo Paci (esp. 1963). 
5 Three even lesser known figures of the early phenomenological movement are Tomoo Otaka, 
Felix Kaufmann, and Kurt Stavenhagen, who have each contributed highly intriguing work to the 
phenomenology of sociality and collectivity (Otaka 1932; Stavenhagen 1933; Kaufmann 1945). 
Though they are not explicitly dealt with within this volume, they should certainly not go missing 
from this list. Incidentally, both Otaka and Kaufmann had an intensive critical exchange with 
Schütz. 
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known proponents of the phenomenology of sociality; and, finally, to contextual-
ize this elaborate body of work within contemporary trends in social philosophy, 
including social cognition research and the ever-growing literature on analytic 
social ontology, as well as the philosophy of emotions and embodiment and the 
broader spectrum of contemporary social and political philosophy.  
 
II. An Overview of the Volume  
 
The volume is divided into five variously interconnected parts. All center on sys-
tematic and thematic rather than purely historical or methodological considera-
tions. To be sure, however, one cannot go about (re-)discovering collectivity in 
phenomenological thought and by means of phenomenological analysis in igno-
rance of the socio-historical context, and without dwelling upon the key method-
ological, meta-theoretical, or foundational issues of such an endeavor. After all, 
and in a rather obvious sense, neither early nor post-Husserlian phenomenolo-
gists devised their conceptions of sociality in a conceptual or sociocultural void. 
Setting the historical and methodological stage, then, and elaborating on the most 
salient normative aspects, ethical motives, and the broader political-philosophical 
background is the task of the opening part of the volume. 
 
Part I: Historical and Methodological Issues 
 
A central question in the phenomenology of sociality is whether I-Thou relations, 
i.e. dyadic, interpersonal relations between subjects who directly address one an-
other, are to be given priority over the standpoint of individuals.  
 In the opening paper, James Risser addresses this issue from a historical per-
spective. The essay follows the complex trail of thinking about the relation be-
tween I and Thou from such diverse, early phenomenological voices as Stein, 
Buber and Löwith up to Gadamer’s hermeneutical version of being- and speak-
ing-with-one-another and Heidegger’s being-with.  
 Closely related to the issue of the priority of I-Thou relations over the indi-
vidual’s first-person perspective, is what Steven Crowell calls ‘second-person phe-
nomenology’, i.e. the reflection on experiencing oneself ‘in the accusative’. Crow-
ell asks whether such experience is constitutive of a shared world, and of such 
essentially normative concepts as responsibility, accountability, self-identity, and 
rationality. Following a broadly Levinasian path, and critically examining Stephen 
Darwall’s contemporary construal of the second-person perspective, Crowell ar-
gues that this is indeed so. Moreover, he shows that the second-person perspec-
tive, in turn, is not a constituted stance, to wit, not constituted by empathy, but 
precisely a constitutive phenomenon. In particular, it constitutes both the other, 
understood as another rational and normatively responsive being, and, at the 
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same time, via the experience of a feeling of obligation towards those others, 
one’s own responsiveness to others’ normative claims.  
 Beyond such foundational issues, Part I also probes phenomenology’s con-
tribution to pre- and post-war (and post-Marxist), as well as contemporary social 
and political, philosophy.  
 Accordingly, Richard Wolin’s essay investigates the status of phenomenology 
vis-à-vis the hermeneutical analysis of the lifeworld and sociality, and in particular 
against the debate on explanation versus understanding in the philosophy of the 
social sciences. Furthermore, the essay elaborates, critically, on Habermas’s com-
municative and normative re-appropriation of the transcendental-
phenomenological idea of a social lifeworld.  
 Sophie Loidolt reexamines the work of one of the eminent figures of post-war 
social and political thought, Hannah Arendt, a thinker who is often sidelined in 
phenomenological scholarship, to be sure, unjustly so. In her paper, Loidolt fo-
cuses on Arendt’s phenomenologically inspired conception of ‘actualized plurali-
ty’, and reconstructs this notion as a specific form of being and living together, 
that is, as a practical enactment of we-intentionality that is not purpose-bound. 
Importantly, the paper demonstrates how Arendt’s social ontology is essentially 
political, without necessarily converging to standard notions of politics. 
 
Part II: Intersubjectivity, the ‘We-World’ and Objectivity 
 
A central issue of any phenomenology of sociality is the question of the priority 
of I-Thou relations over sharedness and collectivity, or the priority of the second-
person singular over the first-person plural perspective. This issue is canvassed 
under a historical and meta-theoretical angle in Part I, and is taken up again and 
expanded on by the contributions in Part II. This part, then, revolves around the 
conceptual trias of intersubjectivity, the notion of a ‘we-world’, and objectivity.  
 The first essay in this section, by Jo-Jo Koo, addresses the foundational issue 
of the commonality of the life-world versus dyadic encounters head-on. Koo ar-
gues—siding with the early Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and in opposition to 
phenomenologists such as Buber, Sartre, Theunissen, or Levinas—that an ade-
quate phenomenology of social reality should grant primacy to the explanation of 
our already sharing a common world. At the same time, he maintains that we 
should not lose sight of the importance of our embodied, inter-personal encoun-
ters with one-another as a crucial explanandum of any phenomenology of sociali-
ty worth its salt.  
 Taking up this lead, Dermot Moran elaborates in more detail on the role that 
embodiment, mutual recognition and the interpenetration of subjective con-
sciousnesses play in the constitution of the intrinsically social life-world. Specifi-
cally, Moran traces the relations between embodied self-experience, experience of 
others, and experience of the world in Merleau-Ponty and in the later Husserl, 
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and explores their notions of ‘we-world’, ‘inter-corporeality’ and ‘interpenetration’ 
(Ineinandersein).  
 Finally, in his essay on the intersubjective constitution of objectivity, Cathal 
O’Madagain argues that combining Husserl’s intersubjective theory of the consti-
tution of intentional objects with Davidson’s theory of the triangulation of sub-
jectivity, objectivity and intersubjectivity yields a novel argument to the effect that 
our very concept of a mind-independent objectivity depends on our interaction with 
others. In doing so, the essay forcefully shows how one may productively bridge 
the gap between analytic and phenomenological thought on sociality, instead of 
engaging in mere turf wars. 
 
Social interaction, including social cognition, not only amounts to specific inten-
tional, epistemic, or agential relations between intrinsically embodied agents, but 
is typically an emotional affair; and, often enough, collective intentionality and 
agency, too, are laden with affectivity. This is the issue that the following two, 
thematically interlinked, sections of the volume address. Accordingly, the contri-
butions in Part IV and V are devoted to the complex web of embodied, affective 
and emotional underpinnings of social interaction, social cognition and collective 
intentionality. Articles here resume and reformulate, yet again, the question of 
whether dyadic or collective forms of social relations are constituents of our so-
cial reality. Thus, a number of essays deal with social emotions and social typifica-
tion in the context of social cognition and collective intentionality (see esp. the 
contributions of Christian Skirke, Matthew Ratcliffe, Eric Chelstrom, and Joona Taipale), 
as well as with the hitherto largely missing link between research on social cogni-
tion and collective intentionality (Felipe Léon). Importantly, the topics covered in 
these two parts straddle a number of philosophical sub-disciplines and neighbour-
ing fields of empirical research, such as social, developmental and moral psychol-
ogy (esp. Joel Krueger, Joona Taipale), moral phenomenology (Alessandro Salice, Ven-
drell Ferran), the philosophy of psychiatry (esp. Matthew Ratcliffe), and health care 
(Havi Carel). 
 
Part III: Social Cognition, Embodiment and Social Emotions  
 
Against the backdrop of these historical, methodological, and conceptual founda-
tions, Part III develops the phenomenology of interpersonal encounters. Here, con-
tributions lay particular stress on the pathological and non-pathological aspects of 
empathy and embodied social interaction. Thus, a number of essays from quite 
different perspectives elaborate on the core phenomenological concept of social 
cognition, or empathy. Unlike standard accounts, however, these essays deal with 
empathy not only within the context of ordinary dyadic encounters but also in the 
context of non-dyadic, collective, or social interaction, social emotions (esp. 
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shame and grief), or non-ordinary interpersonal relations, for instance, in our rela-
tions to the dead, or the chronically ill. 
 Joona Taipale examines the extent to which we always build on assumptions 
concerning general typicalities when experiencing others. He argues that, in em-
pathic encounters, we never meet some wholly unknown, or ‘mysterious’ others, 
but already take others as often predictable representatives of more or less dis-
tinct social groups. Such tacit assumptions point to what Taipale describes as 
‘empathic typification’. Specifically, Taipale shows how empathy is initially ‘type-
oriented’, and only gradually develops into a ‘token-oriented’ experience of con-
crete others. It is worth pointing out in this connection that this issue of social 
typification represents a central desideratum for both contemporary social ontol-
ogy and social philosophy, and notably one that a number of classical phenome-
nologists have long tackled successfully. Incidentally, this is also shown in Eric 
Chelstrom’s contribution, which deals, among others, with this very concept of 
typification in Gurwitsch. 
 Felipe Léon, too, addresses the question of how to best conceive of social 
cognition. Léon concentrates on the most recent trend in social cognition re-
search, in which social cognition is viewed as a specific form of embodied interac-
tion. Drawing on a paradigmatic experimental setting (the ‘perceptual crossing’ 
paradigm), he argues that this theory of social cognition, viz. ‘interaction theory’, 
is best understood as a theory of distinctively shared cognition—without, to be 
sure, eliminating any self/other differentiation, which, rather, is necessary for any 
interpersonal understanding. Consequently, the paper suggests that interaction 
theory provides interesting insights for current discussions of collective intention-
ality.  
 Christian Skirke’s contribution presents another angle on the phenomeno-
logical concept of empathy, by relating the issue of social emotions to social cog-
nition. Skirke argues for a strong parallelism, or structural isomorphism, between 
shame and empathic fellow feeling. He claims that both are intentionally directed 
at, or present, experiences of others that are not originally experienced, or ‘lived 
through’, by the subject of those social experiences. (For a related but different 
analysis of shame, see also the contribution of Steven Crowell). 
 Matthew Ratcliffe starts from the critical observation that works on social 
cognition, and specifically those relying on standard belief-desire psychology, re-
strict their focus to interpersonal relations with the living, and, hence tend to 
overlook our often deeply charged emotional relations with the dead. Against 
this, and drawing on both empirical and literary descriptions of the phenomenon, 
Ratcliffe directly addresses the phenomenology of experiences of grief. In an orig-
inal take, Ratcliffe proposes to view grief as a genuinely second-personal experi-
ence of absence, rather than as the absence of a second-person experience. Con-
sequently, he claims that this stance is firmly embedded in the social life-world 
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and dynamically intermeshed with our other, more ‘ordinary’, interpersonal rela-
tions.  
 Finally, Havi Carel confronts another form of the disruption of ordinary 
embodied interaction by engaging in a phenomenological analysis of the social 
experience of illness and its normative implications. She argues that, with the im-
pediment or breakdown of our embodied social encounters, i.e., our ‘bodily em-
pathy’, in illness, a certain distance or asymmetry between the being-in-the-world 
of the ill person and that of her healthy counterparts is established. Carel then 
shows that what ultimately gets reconfigured, and often truncated, in illness is not 
only the ill person’s relationship to her environment but also the social norms 
that usually underpin such a relationship. 
 
Part IV: Collective Intentionality and Affectivity 
 
What role do emotional and affective components, or a ‘sense of togetherness,’ 
play in collective intentionality, especially—though certainly not exclusively—in 
such highly cohesive or ‘fused’ I-Thou relations as love, friendship, or infant-
caretaker relationships? What effect do social roles, types and functions have for 
such relations? What is the role of emotions in empathy, sympathy and emotional 
contagion, and what role do they play for the understanding of intersubjectivity, 
and for participation in the social world? Are early, so-called ‘realist’, phenomeno-
logical accounts of social emotions better geared to explaining social reality than, 
for example, Schützian phenomenological sociology? And how is (the sociality of) 
affectivity related to normativity and values? 
 In the first, programmatic, essay of this part, Íngrid Vendrell Ferran pleads for 
an alternative construal of a phenomenological sociology, one that puts feelings, 
emotions, sentiments and values, or so-called ‘affective intentionality,’ center 
stage. By bringing into play the resources offered by key representatives of the 
early phenomenological movement of the Munich and Göttingen Circles (and 
esp. Scheler, Stein, Walther, and Hildebrand), she argues that we need to distin-
guish between different ways of being-together, according essentially to different 
levels and dimensions of emotional bonding, as well as different possibilities of 
grasping and sharing values.  
 Alessandro Salice’s contribution can be seen as a prime example of precisely 
such an alternative approach, as he is homing in on early phenomenology’s con-
tributions to a social phenomenology of emotions. In particular, Salice dwells 
upon the similarities and differences between the epistemology and phenomenol-
ogy of genuine ‘social acts’ (Reinach), such as promises or orders, on the one 
hand, and affective or emotional ‘social stances’ (Hildebrand), such as romantic 
love or Scheler’s ‘vicarious feeling’ (Nachfühlen), on the other. By doing so, the 
article, again, successfully testifies that early phenomenologists have the most 
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sophisticated resources to analyze both the normative as well as the affective 
‘glue’ that binds individuals together. 
 In a similar vein, Eric Chelstrom also takes up the challenge of contributing to 
a novel phenomenological sociology, and traces the development of a theory of 
shared emotions in Aron Gurwitsch, an eminent social phenomenologist who 
has, however, hitherto been overshadowed by his colleague and close friend, Al-
fred Schütz, the founding father of phenomenological sociology. Critically, and 
with respect to current treatments of collective intentionality (esp. by Gilbert and 
Bratman), Chelstrom fleshes out the intricate distinctions that Gurwitsch draws 
between different types of social connections (i.e., societal, or instrumental, ‘part-
nerships’, membership-based affective communities, and still more affectively 
charged interpersonal and collective bonds, so-called ‘fusions’). In particular, he 
discusses the different functions that affectivity plays in those social relationships, 
which, in turn, largely depend on the symmetrical or asymmetric distribution of 
the participants’ social roles. 
 In the last paper of this part, while still investigating the nature and struc-
ture of emotional sharing, Joel Krueger suggests looking more closely at the way 
emotions may be jointly regulated by two or more subjects, in order to get a grip 
on the idea that, numerically, the same emotions can be given or experienced by 
more than one subject. Building on both phenomenology as well as developmen-
tal and social psychology, Krueger then argues that the very phenomenology of 
(shared) emotions is modulated by embodied processes of emotion regulation, 
processes, that is, that may indeed be distributed across subjects. This, as Krueger 
demonstrates, happens essentially through the ‘co-regulation’ of emotions by ‘off-
loading’ self-regulative processes to others, as is characteristic, for example, in 
infant-caretaker situations, or parental grieving, or by means of mutual affective 
‘entrainment’, for instance, jointly attending to music.  
 
Part V: Collective Agency, and Group Personhood 
 
The articles in the final part of the volume pick up the main issues of the debate 
on collective intentionality discussed from the perspective of affectivity and emo-
tions in Part IV. Here, the contributors focus more on agential, practical, and 
normative aspects, and embark on reassessing three major figures of phenomeno-
logical social ontology. The three essays in this section are tightly interconnected, 
though each deals with thinkers of the phenomenological movement who could 
hardly be more different in philosophical, but also socio-political, temperament 
(Sartre, Scheler, and Husserl). While the first article examines in more general 
ontological terms the emergence or genetic constitution of social groupings 
(Emanuele Caminada), and the second article engages in a structural as well as a 
normative evaluation of the issue of collectivism in phenomenology, the third and 
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final essay concentrates, from a socio-political and moral-philosophical angle, on 
practical ‘groups-in-action’, as it were (Nicolas de Warren).  
 The main questions guiding these spotlights on the ontological and norma-
tive fabric of social reality can be summarized as followed: what individuates dif-
ferent types of social formations, or ‘groupings’ of individuals? Put differently: 
what kinds of ‘forms of togetherness’ correspond to various levels of robustness 
of collective intentionality (e.g., ‘fused groups’, ‘serialized collectives’, ‘communal 
persons’, ‘plural agents’, etc.)? What is the phenomenological structure of practi-
cal and theoretical forms of collective intentionality, or collective agency, and how 
do they emerge genetically, or come to be constituted? What is the role of habit 
and habituality in collective engagements? Do we need to postulate some supra-
individual ‘bearer’ of collective intentionality? In particular, can and should we 
posit any group persons in our social ontology?  
 Emanuele Caminada addresses these questions by couching Husserl’s ‘inten-
tional’ or ‘transcendental sociology’ within the framework set by contemporary 
social ontology. He focuses, specifically, on the structural and genetic elements in 
the constitution of always and already ‘socialized’ individuals as well as of ‘higher-
order’, or ‘supra-individual’, socialities (e.g., the role of embodied or communal 
habitualities, or shared background beliefs). In doing so, Caminada critically 
launches a two-fold challenge: the challenge that ‘discovering the We’ poses for 
the classical transcendental-phenomenological project, and, conversely, the chal-
lenge that phenomenologically, and genetically, ‘enriched’ forms of the ‘We’ 
might pose for those social ontologists who typically abstract from the concrete 
life-world in which such communities are embedded. 
 Expounding the discussion of higher-order persons, which is briefly dis-
cussed in the previous article, Thomas Szanto tackles the question whether there 
are, in the face of contemporary metaphysical and normative accounts of group 
personhood (e.g., by Philip Pettit or Carol Rovane), any viable, i.e., non-
collectivist, conceptions of group personhood in phenomenological thought. 
Along the lines of a critical, yet ultimately favorable, reassessment of Scheler’s 
notoriously ambiguous conception of communal persons (Gesamtpersonen), Szanto 
investigates the normative, rational and phenomenological properties of corpo-
rate persons. In order to safeguard this conception from normative distortions, 
he then suggests distinguishing different versions of collectivist claims, and argues 
that Scheler can, in fact, accommodate these distinctions. 
 In the final essay of this volume, Nicolas de Warren touches on the political 
dimensions of the ‘We’ by reintroducing a highly intriguing but much-neglected 
major work in phenomenological social ontology, namely the late Sartre’s Critique 
of Dialectical Reason, to contemporary readership. This seems all the more pertinent 
as ignorance of this work, even among otherwise avid readers of Sartre, is prevail-
ing, which is, arguably, due to the work’s unflinching adherence to a radical form 
of (Soviet) Marxism. The article revolves around the Sartrean notion of ‘fraterni-
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ty’, and its group-membership-based distortion in acts of terror against traitors. 
The group paradigm, here, is comprised of such highly cohesive and essentially 
‘practical’ groups that emerge out of, often implicit, ‘pledges’ (le serments, which 
are notably, Sartre’s version of what, in Margaret Gilbert’s influential terminology, 
would today be labeled ‘joint commitments’). In elucidating these notions, de War-
ren unearths Sartre’s distinctively political version of social ontology, and hence 
demonstrates how it is amenable to current discourses on terrorism, social identi-
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